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Editorial 
The recovery is now taking hold in the euro 
area. After a disappointing first half of the 
year, GDP growth resumed in the third 
quarter and strong gains in business 
confidence over the past months indicate that 
activity is set to pick up further speed in the 
months ahead. Owing to a simultaneous 
upturn in all major parts of the world, the 
international environment is becoming 
increasingly supportive. Domestic demand has 
so far remained sluggish but should 
progressively gather momentum on the back 
of the recovery of private consumption.  
In sum, recent economic developments are 
encouraging. It is now time to take advantage 
of improving short-term economic conditions 
to reinforce the economy’s long-term growth 
potential. A well-defined strategy is in place 
which aims at improving the long-term 
capacity for sustainable non-inflationary 
growth. The strategy was set out in Lisbon in 
2000 and is further specified in the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines. It rests on the 
combination of a stable macroeconomic 
environment and structural measures aimed at 
lifting potential growth. In a short-term 
perspective, moving ahead with the Lisbon 
agenda is necessary to underpin the nascent 
recovery and reap the full benefits of a strong 
euro while limiting its adverse effects on 
external competitiveness. In a longer-term 
perspective, reforms will raise living standards 
and help to tackle the economic and financial 
consequences of the ageing of the population.  
As to macroeconomic stability, the recent 
setback with the agreed fiscal framework is 
worrying. The failure of the ECOFIN Council 
to abide by the letter and the spirit of the 
Treaty is deeply regrettable on several 
accounts. Firstly, it is essential to stress that 
excessive deficits do not only reflect cyclical 
circumstances but are also the consequence of 
expansionary fiscal policies earlier in the cycle. 
The experience of the last few years shows 
that in the case of France and Germany these 
policies have failed to stimulate demand. On 
the other hand, they carry risks of higher 
interest rates in the longer term for the euro 
area as a whole and of negative repercussions 
on household and business expectations. 
Secondly, the failure to rein in public deficits 
in some Member States threatens the long-
term sustainability of public finances in the 
context of an ageing population. Thirdly, 
excessive deficits for a prolonged period in 
the largest Member States will make the 
conduct of sound budgetary policies more 
difficult in other Member States and in 
acceding countries. Finally, only a rule-based 
system such as the Stability and Growth Pact 
can guarantee that commitments are enforced 
and that all Member States are treated equally.  
Overall, the recent difficulties with multilateral 
fiscal surveillance call for stronger economic 
governance in the euro area.  
Turning to structural reforms, it is important 
to underline that past efforts have paid off. 
Despite the economic downturn, about a 
million and a half jobs were created in the 
euro area between the end of 2000 and mid-
2003, a performance which has allowed the 
normal cyclical rise of unemployment to be 
kept in check. Employment rates have 
continued to increase whereas the rate of 
long-term unemployment has been on a 
downward trend. This clearly shows that the 
rewards for reforms can be substantial.  
Nevertheless, the pace of reforms must be 
stepped up if we are to meet the ambitious 
employment and growth objectives set in 
Lisbon. Human resources remain 
underutilised. Furthermore, the economy is 
still insufficiently resilient to shocks and has 
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emerged only slowly from the recent 
downturn. Last but not least, the euro area has 
posted a disappointing productivity 
performance in recent years even when taking 
into account the impact of the deterioration 
of cyclical conditions.  
Lifting the economy’s growth potential 
requires a two-handed approach: barriers to 
employment must be further removed and 
conditions allowing the economy to deliver 
faster productivity gains must be put in place. 
Next month, the Commission will take stock 
of the progress made with the implementation 
of the BEPGs and will present a complete 
assessment of what further efforts are 
necessary in its Spring Report.  
Looking further into the disappointing 
productivity performance of the euro area, the 
analysis presented in the focus section of the 
present Quarterly Report shows that about a 
quarter of the overall slowdown in 
productivity growth since the mid-1990s can 
be attributed to a reversal of the excessive 
capital/labour substitution observed in the 
past. This effect is the flip side of the high 
employment content of growth observed in 
recent years. It will be only transitory and will 
disappear once the labour market has reached 
a new equilibrium with a higher rate of 
employment. Other, more important, sources 
of the productivity slowdown include a 
downward trend in investment rates and a 
worrying deterioration of the rate of technical 
progress.  
Some commentators see Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) as lying at 
the root of the productivity problem in the 
euro area. However, it is important to 
highlight that ICT has contributed positively 
to productivity in the euro area since the mid-
1990s. This contribution has been much lower 
than in the USA, mainly due to slower 
diffusion of ICT and difficulties in exploiting 
its full benefits. Hence ICT can partly explain 
diverging productivity trends in the euro area 
and the USA in recent years but it cannot 
account for the observed deceleration of 
productivity growth in the euro area.  
From a policy perspective, research also 
shows that, in order to reverse recent adverse 
productivity trends, forceful action is needed 
in four areas. Firstly, the burden of excessive 
regulation must be lightened to foster 
competition and investment. Secondly, 
financial markets must be further developed 
and integrated. Thirdly, further progress is 
also necessary with product market 
integration. Finally, conditions for a 
significant rise in investment in education and 
research and development must be put in 
place.  
 
Pedro SOLBES 
MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
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I. Economic situation in the euro area 
Recent data confirm the scenario of a progressive recovery taking hold in the euro area during the second half of 2003. After 
a slight contraction in the second quarter, GDP resumed a growth path in the third quarter, increasing slightly faster than 
expected. Leading indicators have continued to improve in the past months with business confidence returning to levels last 
seen in summer 2001 and household sentiment showing more modest gains. This suggests that the recovery rests on firm 
grounds and presages a further pick-up of growth in the first quarter of 2004. The euro-area recovery has so far been export 
driven and external demand will continue to be buoyed by a synchronised upturn in all major parts of the world. Domestic 
demand should progressively gather momentum in the months to come on the back of strengthening private consumption. 
Inflation has recently been stickier than expected but a cyclical pick-up in productivity and a further pass-through of the euro 
appreciation into consumer prices will help to dampen price pressures in the coming months. 
1. Economic situation1 
Increasing signs of recovery in the euro area 
The first national account estimates for the third 
quarter confirm that the recovery has been 
progressively taking hold in the euro area during 
the second half of 2003. After a modest 
contraction in the second quarter, GDP 
surprised slightly on the upside over the summer, 
increasing by 0.4% quarter-on-quarter. Activity 
was driven by a solid pick-up in exports with 
domestic demand remaining weak. 
                                                      
1 The cut-off date for statistics included in this issue was 
12 December 2003.  
The steady strengthening in confidence observed 
in the past months suggests that the recent 
improvement in GDP growth rests on firm 
grounds. The business climate indicator 
registered its fourth successive increase in 
November, posting its highest value since June 
2001. Reuters manufacturing PMI has posted a 
similar upturn since July and is now well above 
the 50 threshold that separates expansion from 
contraction. The improvement in sentiment in 
the past months has been even more 
pronounced in the service sector which has acted 
as a major driving force in the recovery. In the 
case of DG ECFIN surveys, the recovery of 
sentiment began four months earlier in the  
 
Table 1: Euro-area growth components 
Autumn 03 forecasts 02 Q4 03 Q1 03 Q2 03 Q3 Carryover03 Q3 2003 2004
 % change on previous quarter, volumes(1) 
GDP 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.4 0.3 0.4 1.8 
Private consumption 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.0 1.1 1.3 1.6 
Government consumption 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.6 1.7 1.3 
Gross fixed capital formation 0.3 -1.1 -0.5 -0.5 -1.9 -1.0 2.4 
Changes in inventories (% of GDP) 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.4  0.0 -0.1 0.0 
Exports of goods and services -0.2 -1.5 -0.6 2.2 0.4 -0.1 5.1 
Imports of goods and services 0.8 -0.6 -0.2 -0.4 0.8 1.6 5.2 
 % contribution to change in GDP 
Private consumption 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 0.9
Government consumption 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Gross fixed capital formation 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.2 0.5 
Changes in inventories 0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Net exports 0.2 -0.8 -0.3 0.8 -0.2 -0.6 0.1 
(1) Annual change in % for carryover. 
Source : Commission services. 
 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area IV/2003 
 
 
 
- 6 - 
 - 
service sector than in the manufacturing sector. 
Since spring, the increase in confidence – as 
measured in terms of the series’ standard 
deviation – has been broadly twice as large for 
services as for manufacturing. A similar 
difference has been observed in the case of 
Reuters manufacturing PMI and service 
indicators.  
Graph 1: Business confidence (1), euro area 
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(1) Normalised series.
Source: Commission services.
 
Hard data on industrial activity have so far 
remained somewhat disappointing. 
Manufacturing output contracted in August and 
September, with year-on-year growth remaining 
in negative territory. This partly reflects 
unfavourable calendar effects but it is also in line 
with the strong de-stocking reported in national 
accounts in the third quarter. However, October 
industrial production data, which are already 
available for a few Member States, point to a 
significant pick-up in industrial production in 
some countries. Furthermore, industrialists have 
reported marked improvements in their 
assessment of recent production trends in 
business surveys and this should be reflected in 
production data in the last months of the year. 
Finally, new orders have sent out signs of a 
modest upturn over the summer (see Box 1). 
Graph 2: Euro area : GDP growth rate
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Overall, recent developments in leading 
indicators are consistent with a continued 
recovery in the coming months. The indicator-
based model for quarterly GDP growth for the 
euro area, developed by DG ECFIN, forecasts a 
range of 0.2% to 0.6% for GDP growth in the 
fourth quarter of 2003. For the first quarter of 
2004, the model suggests a range of 0.3% to 
0.7%. These short-term projections are in line 
with the scenario presented in the Commission’s 
Autumn Economic Forecasts of a return to 
potential growth around mid-2004.  
Table 2: Selected euro area and national leading indicators, 2003 
 SENT. IND1) BCI2) OECD3) PMI4) Reuters Ser5) IFO6) NBB7) ZEW8) 
Long-term average 96.2 0.0 2.9 52.2 54.2 98.8 -13.6 43.8 
Trough in latest 
downturn 94.6 -1.2 -3.3 42.9 46.7 89.6 -21.1 -10.4 
February 2003 95.1 -0.27 0.5 50.1 48.9 98.4 -10.5 15.0 
March 2003 94.6 -0.63 0.3 48.4 47.7 97.3 -17.4 17.7 
April 2003 94.7 -0.53 0.1 47.8 47.7 95.1 -20.5 18.4 
May 2003 94.8 -0.63 0.9 46.8 47.9 97.4 -18.3 18.7 
June 2003 94.8 -0.65 1.9 46.4 48.2 98.8 -26.5 21.3 
July 2003 94.7 -0.78 3.1 48.0 50.2 100.4 -19.3 41.9 
August 2003 95.0 -0.49 4.2 49.1 52.0 102.3 -14.3 52.5 
September 2003 95.3 -0.46 5.8 50.1 53.6 105.3 -14.5 60.9 
October 2003 95.5 -0.21 6.7 51.3 56.0 107.9 -10.6 60.3 
November 2003 95.9 0.02  52.2 56.5 108.7 -8.8 67.2 
December 2003        73.4 
1) Economic sentiment indicator, DG ECFIN. 2) Business climate indicator, DG ECFIN. 3) Composite leading indicator, six 
monthly change. 4) Reuters Purchasing managers index, manufacturing. 5)  Reuters Services purchasing manager index. 6) Business 
expectations, West Germany. 7)  National Bank of Belgium indicator for manufacturing. 8) Business expectations of financial market 
analysts, Germany. 
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A supportive international environment 
After having contracted during the first half of 
the year, exports rebounded strongly in the third 
quarter, increasing by 2.2% (non-annualised 
q-o-q). Against the background of competitive 
pressures due to the strengthening of the euro 
(see section on Macroeconomic policy mix), the 
turnaround in euro-area exports heralds a 
sustained recovery in world demand.  
During the past two quarters, one of the major 
driving forces of the world economy has been a 
solid recovery of the US economy. The latest 
release of the national accounts surprised on the 
upside, with US GDP growth exceeding 8% in 
annualised terms in the third quarter. According 
to the latest surveys, firms expect a further 
acceleration of activity over the coming quarters. 
The US labour market finally started to record 
employment gains in September and October, an 
improvement that should underpin consumer 
confidence.  
However, the recovery of the world economy is 
broad based. In Japan, significant structural 
imbalances remain, but the growth outlook is 
improving, supported by better prospects for key 
export markets as well as renewed strength in 
domestic demand. Growth expectations for the 
other East Asian economies have improved as 
well. Growth in the euro-area’s neighbouring 
countries has also picked up. In the UK, the 
largest trade partner of the euro area, growth 
accelerated markedly in the second and the third 
quarters on the back of an upturn in investment. 
Growth in the acceding countries is also holding 
up relatively well.  
The strengthening of world demand is also 
visible in the order books of euro-area 
companies, suggesting that the upturn in world 
trade has further bolstered euro-area exports in 
the last months of 2003. Eurostat’s recently 
released indicator of new orders – available until 
September – points to a more significant 
recovery of order books related to the external 
markets than of those related to the domestic 
market. New orders from the external market 
have been on a gentle upward trend since the 
beginning of 2003 whereas a turnaround in 
domestic new orders was only registered in the 
third quarter of the year.  
The simultaneous recovery in all major parts of 
the world will be self-reinforcing and should lead 
to sustained growth in the world economy in 
2004. According to the Commission’s Autumn 
Economic Forecasts, world GDP excluding the 
euro area will grow by 3.8% in 2003 and 
accelerate to 4.4% in 2004. World trade growth 
is projected at 5.7% this year and 8% next year. 
A slow pick-up in domestic demand  
Domestic demand has so far remained quite 
sluggish. It declined in the third quarter, posting 
the fastest rate of contraction since the 
beginning of the downturn. Demand weakness 
partly reflects a substantial depletion of 
inventories. In addition, private consumption 
and investment have so far failed to show clear 
signs of recovery. However, despite 
disappointing recent developments, domestic 
demand should progressively gather momentum 
on the back of rising consumer spending in the 
months to come. The sectoral breakdown of 
GDP data points to a significant recovery in 
production in the service sector in the third 
quarter. Service surveys are also upbeat. As 
services are not very trade intensive, this suggests 
that there is more underlying strength in 
domestic demand than shown in the national 
account data so far.  
After having been the economy’s main driving 
force during most of the downturn, private 
consumption has remained flat during the past 
two quarters. Several forces have weighed on 
private spending. Purchasing power has been 
impaired by persistent inflation pressures (see 
Section 2 on inflation). Employment growth has 
been broadly flat since the second half of 2002. 
Last but not least, recent setbacks with the EU’s 
fiscal framework may have weighed on 
consumer confidence in some Member States. 
However, determinants of consumption are 
progressively turning more supportive:  
• inflation should resume a downward course as 
the strong euro feeds further into consumer 
prices and unit labour cost pressures ease on 
the back of a recovery of productivity; 
• household sentiment is improving slowly on 
the back of receding worries on employment; 
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• interest rates are at historically low levels; 
• stock prices have been on an upward trend 
since April.  
Corporate spending as reflected in inventories 
and investment has so far remained quite weak. 
After a moderate expansion during the first half 
of the year, inventories contracted again in the 
third quarter, curtailing GDP growth by more 
than half a percentage point. This negative 
contribution is somewhat at odds with recent 
developments in manufacturing surveys. The 
indicator measuring manufacturers’ assessment 
of inventories increased somewhat in 
July/August, suggesting that the level of stocks 
was then judged slightly too high, before 
improving again between September and 
November. However, the size of the inventory 
draw-down in the third quarter is above what 
would be warranted on the basis of 
manufacturing surveys (see Graph 3). To a 
certain extent, it may reflect a correction to an 
excessive inventory build-up during the first half 
of the year. The inventory contraction was 
probably also partly involuntary, reflecting 
stronger external demand pressures than 
expected by manufacturers. This would be in line 
with the observed sluggish growth in 
manufacturing production in the third quarter 
and heralds a positive contribution of inventories 
to GDP growth in the fourth quarter. 
Box 1: An indicator of new orders for the euro area  
In November, Eurostat began publishing an index of industrial new orders for the euro area. The index 
includes new orders for export as well as domestic markets. It covers all manufacturing industries ‘working 
on orders’ (i.e. textile, chemicals, basic metals and fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment, 
electrical and electronic equipment, transport equipment and pulp, paper and paper products). These sectors 
account for more than 60% of manufacturing production in the euro area. The index is available with a two 
month lag similar to industrial production data. Hence, the November release presents data up to 
September. The indicator has recently posted some signs of improvement. In September, year-on-year 
growth in new orders moved into positive territory for the first time since February. As is frequently the 
case with statistics related to new orders, the series shows substantial volatility but a moderate upturn is 
also noticeable when looking at the more stable quarterly averages: after 4 quarters of decline, new orders 
increased marginally during the three months to September. The indicator’s trendline (as calculated by 
Eurostat) has also shown a slight upturn since June. Overall, new orders have recently been sending out 
somewhat more positive signals than industrial production which kept on contracting over the summer and 
has not posted any change in trend so far.  
New orders in manufacturing, euro area
(index 100 in 2000  )
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Nevertheless, some prudence is warranted when interpreting this new indicator. With data only available 
back to 1996, the quality of the series is difficult to assess. Over this short sample, new orders are closely 
correlated with industrial production (contemporaneous correlation with industrial growth is very high, at 
above 80%). However, they show no strong leading properties with respect to production or investment. 
Based on correlation analysis, new orders are more closely linked to gross fixed capital formation than to 
GDP. The series can be used to improve the short-term forecasting of investment but it is slightly inferior to 
industrial production in that respect. 
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Graph 3: Assessment of inventories in DG ECFIN's 
manufacturing survey, euro area 
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Source: Commission services.  
Recent developments on investment are no 
more upbeat. Gross fixed capital formation has 
been contracting steadily since the beginning of 
the year. Investment is currently subject to 
conflicting forces.  
On the one hand, activity is picking up, business 
confidence is improving, financial conditions are 
supportive and there are indirect signs that 
balance sheet pressures have eased (as reported 
in the previous issue of this report).  
On the other hand, the level of indebtedness of 
the corporate sector remains high by historical 
standards. Even if the corresponding burden in 
terms of interest payment remains sustainable 
due to low interest rates, further sharp rises in 
debt appear unlikely in the short term. 
Furthermore, the adjustment of the corporate 
sector to the downturn in terms of debt and 
productivity has been rather slow, particularly 
when compared with what has been observed in 
the USA (see Section 3). After some 
improvements in 2002, productivity has 
remained flat in the past three quarters and 
modest tensions on profitability have resurfaced.  
Overall, this suggests that the investment 
recovery will only be gradual in the euro area. It 
is, however, encouraging to note that new orders 
of capital goods, which had remained on a 
downward course since mid-2002, increased 
again during the summer.  
Short-term risks appear balanced  
Risks to the short-term outlook now appear 
relatively balanced.  
Some upside risks are attached to the ongoing 
world recovery. A simultaneous upturn in all 
major parts of the world could have self-
reinforcing effects and translate into a stronger 
acceleration of world demand than envisaged. 
On the domestic side, there is some indication of 
pent-up demand that could lead to a strong 
revival of consumer spending. 
Downside risks are related to both the external 
and the domestic sector. Although past euro-area 
recoveries have generally been driven by exports 
in their early stages, the recent renewed bout of 
weakness of the dollar, with the dollar-euro 
exchange rate climbing above 1.20, underlines 
the risks attached to this scenario.  
Regarding the domestic sector, the anticipated 
pick-up of domestic demand requires strong 
consumer and business confidence. In this 
respect, recent setbacks with the EU’s fiscal 
framework cast a shadow on forthcoming 
improvements in sentiment. Failure to pursue 
structural reforms in order to raise employment 
rates and productivity could also weigh on 
confidence and spending.  
Macroeconomic policy mix  
Monetary conditions 
After a short interruption over the summer, the 
euro exchange rate has continued to strengthen 
against the dollar. By the end of November it 
exceeded 1.20 for the first time in its history. 
Against the background of a resurgence of fears 
related to the twin deficits, financial markets are 
increasingly concerned about the continued 
dependence of the USA on external financing. 
Early December, the euro had gained 16% 
against the US dollar relative to the beginning of 
the year. However, in nominal effective terms, 
the appreciation was only 8%. Furthermore, the 
nominal effective exchange rate of the euro 
remained below the 2003 peak reached end of 
May while its real effective exchange rate was 
only slightly above the long-term average. 
Overall, while the appreciation of the euro is 
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having a negative impact on the price 
competitiveness of the euro-area export and 
import competing industries, it also supports 
domestic demand thanks to improved terms of 
trade and lower inflation.  
Graph 4: Euro-USD exchange rate and NEER (1)
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Nominal short-term interest rates have been 
fairly stable since June. In November, the 3-
month rate (nominal) was around 15 basis points 
higher than ECB’s minimum bid rate, which has 
been unchanged at 2% since 6 June 2003.   
Graph 5: Euro-area MCI
Index Jan 1999=0 (inverted scale)
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Source:  Commission services.  
Since June, short-term real interest rates have 
also remained fairly stable, but as a result of the 
real effective appreciation of the euro, monetary 
conditions as measured by the MCI index2 
became somewhat tighter in October (last 
available month). However, the MCI suggests 
that monetary conditions were not less loose in 
October than at the beginning of the year (see 
Graph 5). 
                                                      
2 The MCI tries to capture the combined impact on 
economic activity of changes in the real effective 
exchange rate and the real short-term interest rate.  
After a strong surge since mid-June, long-term 
interest rates started to decrease again during 
September. Since then, rates have renewed their 
upward trend probably due to upward revisions 
of growth and inflation expectations for both the 
US and the euro area. Government bond yields 
have now edged up to their highest level in 2003, 
but seen in a historical and cyclical perspective 
remain quite low. Throughout 2003, spreads 
between government and corporate bonds 
continued to decline reaching pre-2000 levels by 
the end of November. The steady decrease in 
corporate spreads has partly offset the upward 
movement on long rates observed in the past 
two months.  
Against the background of indications of a 
global economic recovery, stock markets 
recovered in the spring and the summer from 
the low level reached in March just before the 
outbreak of the Iraq-war. Compared to March, 
stock market indices for the euro area show an 
increase of almost 30% indicating improved 
financing conditions for the corporate sector.  
Budgetary developments  
This year, the budgetary situation in the euro 
area has further deteriorated. According to the 
Commission’s Autumn Economic Forecasts, the 
budget deficit in the euro area is expected to be 
2.8% of GDP, which is 0.6% higher than in 
2002. The deterioration is mainly explained by 
the weak economic situation and reflects the 
working of automatic stabilizers.  
Source : Commission services.
Graph 6: Fiscal stance and cyclical conditions, 
euro area (1999-2003)
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After a fiscal loosening in the period 2000-2002, 
the aggregate fiscal stance for the euro area 
remained broadly neutral in 2003 (Graph 6). The 
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neutral fiscal stance, measured by the change in 
the cyclically-adjusted primary balance, implies 
that no further budgetary consolidation was 
made.  
Graph 7: Policy-mix in the euro area
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Monetary stance
(Change in real short-term interest rates in %)
Fis
ca
l s
tan
ce
 
(C
ha
ng
e i
n C
AP
B 
in 
%
 of
 G
DP
) Fiscal/Monetary tightening
Fiscal/Monetary 
loosening
Fiscal loosening / Monetary 
tightening
Fiscal  tightening / 
Monetary loosening
Source : Commission services.  
Graph 7 illustrates the overall policy mix in the 
euro area. While the monetary stance, 
approximated by the change in short-term real 
interest rates, has been accommodative in recent 
years, the fiscal stance has changed from 
accommodative to neutral.  
Looking ahead to 2004, the Commission’s 
Autumn 2003 Economic Forecasts anticipate a 
slight improvement in the average euro-area 
budget deficit to 2.7% of GDP. Measured by 
cyclically-adjusted figures, the improvement is 
similar with a decrease of 0.2 percentage points 
to 2.1% of GDP in 2004.   
2. Price stickiness in the euro area  
One of the main features of recent 
developments in euro-area inflation has been a 
certain stickiness in the face of sluggish 
economic activity and the appreciation of the 
euro exchange rate. While both factors should 
have exerted sizeable downward pressure on 
prices, consumer price inflation continued to 
hover at a level of around 2% year-on-year 
throughout 2003. It slowed to 1.8% in May, 
which was the lowest level for three years time, 
but has accelerated again since then. According 
to Eurostat’s flash estimate, headline inflation 
stood at 2.2% (year-on-year) in November 2003.  
Temporary factors have helped to keep inflation above 
2%. New rises in oil prices, weather-related 
increases in food prices and increases in indirect 
taxes have been important factors in explaining 
the resilience of inflation so far this year.  
• Due to renewed increases in oil prices and a 
temporary weakening of the euro exchange 
rate, energy inflation accelerated over the 
summer. Since September, falling oil prices 
and the renewed strength of the euro have 
caused a marked deceleration in the 
contribution of this component to inflation. 
• The exceptionally warm weather conditions 
in some Member States last summer resulted 
in price hikes in fruit and vegetables. There 
are indications that the inflationary pressures 
from the damage to harvests over the 
summer are likely to continue feeding 
inflation.  
• Indirect tax increases in some Member 
States pushed up inflation. For instance, 
inflation in tobacco has been running at over 
7.5% for most of the year. Announced 
measures regarding indirect taxes on tobacco 
by some Member States suggest further 
inflationary impulses from this source in the 
coming months.3 
Graph 8: Headline and core inflation, euro area 
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Source: Commission services.  
But developments in core inflation show that more lasting 
factors are also to blame. In view of the subdued 
demand conditions, developments in core 
inflation (HICP excluding energy and 
unprocessed food) have disappointed. Although 
core inflation slowed to 1.8% in July 2003, the 
lowest rate in close to 2½ years, it was back at 
2.0% in October 2003.  
                                                      
3 Moreover, the announced health care reform in Germany 
is estimated to cause a base effect in the rate of inflation 
of about 0.5 percentage point in Germany in 2004, which 
would mechanically add 0.1 to 0.2 to the euro-area rate of 
inflation. 
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• The recent stickiness of core inflation can 
partly be attributed to relatively high 
inflation in services. After the lowest rate of 
service inflation in over two years was 
recorded at 2.3% in July 2003, service 
inflation picked up again in September 2003 
and has remained at a level of 2.5% since 
then.  
• After a continuous decline throughout 2002, 
consumer price inflation in non-energy 
industrial goods did not ease further in 2003, 
but stabilised at a level of 0.8%. This is just 
below the five year average for this 
component, suggesting that inflation in non-
energy industrial goods has not yet fully 
reacted to the impact of weak demand 
conditions and the appreciation of the euro. 
Inflation has shown little cyclical sensitivity in the current 
downturn. All other things being equal, standard 
macroeconomic theory postulates that when real 
GDP growth falls below potential there are 
downward pressures on inflation in the 
economy. However, the recent experience 
suggests that consumer price inflation is 
relatively resistant to subdued demand. As can 
be seen in the next graph, core HICP inflation 
stabilised four quarters after real GDP growth 
fell for the first time below the potential rate in 
2001Q2 and started slowing four quarters later. 
Graph 9: GDP growth and core inflation
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Limited cyclical sensitivity can partly be related to labour 
cost developments. Nominal growth in labour costs 
(including wage and non-wage labour costs) has 
remained in a narrow range around 2¾% in 
year-on-year terms since the beginning of the 
downturn. As a result, fluctuations in the growth 
of unit labour costs in recent years have 
essentially mirrored changes in productivity. 
With labour productivity showing a marked 
cyclical slowdown, nominal unit labour costs 
increased significantly in 2001 and at the 
beginning of 2002. After showing some sign of 
easing during the course of 2002, unit labour 
costs picked up again during the first half of 
2003 on the back of another slowdown in 
productivity. In the second quarter of 2003, year-
on-year growth in unit labour cost was back at 
2.5%, against 1.5% at the end of 2002.  
It is worth stressing that measures of total labour 
cost (i.e. the sum of wage and non-wage labour 
costs) fail to give the full picture. There is some 
evidence that wage moderation has been more 
significant in the euro area than suggested by 
total labour cost numbers but this wage 
moderation has been partially offset by policy 
increases in non-wage labour costs. For instance, 
DG ECFIN’s wage indicator (mostly based on 
hourly earnings) suggests that wage growth has 
slowed somewhat in the euro area in 2003 
compared to 2002. Since the first quarter of 
2002, growth of hourly non-wage labour costs 
has consistently exceeded that of wage labour 
costs, with the difference averaging 0.5% points.  
The full pass-through of the exchange rate appreciation is 
still awaited. Late November/early December, the 
USD/EUR exchange rate had exceeded the 1.20 
level, an appreciation of about 30% relative to its 
average value of 0.92 for the 1999-02 period. 
The sharp strengthening of the euro since 2002 
has fuelled expectations of downward pressures 
on inflation via subdued import prices.  
Graph 10: Unit values for imports (UVI) and NEER, 
euro area
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Source :  Commission services.   
Existing empirical research shows that, while 
import prices are quickly affected by changes in 
the NEER (nominal effective exchange rate), it 
usually takes more time for them to feed through 
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to consumer and producer prices. For import 
prices it appears that between 20-50% of the 
total effect of a NEER change unfolds on 
impact, with the remaining percentage spread 
over 3-8 quarters. As far as consumer/producer 
prices are concerned however, the impact effect 
is virtually meaningless. Time lags of up to 1 ½ 
to 2 years seem to be needed for the latter to 
effectively respond, with consumer prices taking 
a further quarter more.4  
Graph 11: HICP non-energy industrial goods and NEER, 
euro area
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Comparing recent price developments with the 
evidence on lag structures from recent research 
studies, it seems that much of the effect of the 
earlier appreciation of the euro has already been 
passed on to import prices. However, it is likely 
that the full impact on consumer prices has not 
yet materialised. Accordingly, further downward 
pressures on prices are expected from this 
source in the months to come.  
Graph 12: Consumers' inflation expectations, 
euro area (consumer surveys)
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Source: Commission services.  
                                                      
4  For a review of recent empirical studies, see European 
Commission (2003) “The EU Economy 2003 Review”, 
European Economy No 6, Chapter 1, Box 3. 
Inflation will decelerate only gradually over the coming 
months. Overall, the recent stickiness of inflation 
reflects temporary factors but also some labour 
cost pressures and a slow pass-through of the 
euro appreciation into consumer prices. Further 
pass-through effects from the strong euro and a 
cyclical pick-up in productivity will dampen price 
pressures in the months to come, translating into 
a gradual decline of inflation. In addition, short-
term inflation expectations as measured by 
consumer surveys have come down again since 
spring and are quite low by historical standards. 
On a more negative note, the long-term inflation 
expectations of financial markets as measured by 
index-linked bonds have shown an increase in 
recent months. This may be due to technical 
factors but warrants close monitoring. 
Furthermore, increases in administered prices, 
further rises in indirect taxes and weather-related 
price pressures in the food sector could slow the 
disinflation process in the coming months. 
3. Business cycle linkages between the 
euro area and the USA  
Against the background of improving hard and 
soft data in the euro area, the sharp pick-up in 
US growth in the past two quarters has 
reinforced expectations of a solid upturn in the 
euro area. However, the implications of the US 
recovery for the euro area will depend on the 
nature of the prevailing cyclical linkages between 
the two regions. This section sheds some light 
on these linkages. In particular, it endeavours to 
disentangle the respective roles of trade and 
financial linkages from common shocks in 
explaining the recent strong synchronisation of 
the euro-area and US business cycles.  
A high degree of cyclical synchronisation 
since the late 1990s 
Comparisons of cyclical fluctuations based on 
GDP growth are complicated by the fact that 
quarterly growth is relatively volatile and has 
been subject to changes in trends over the past 
decades both in the euro area and the USA. A 
way to avoid these shortcomings is to analyse the 
business cycle based on de-trended data. 
Graph 13 (next page) displays the output gap 
over 1975-03 as estimated with a Baxter-King 
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(BK) filter.5 Over the past three decades, the two 
series have posted a significant degree of co-
movement, with a clear lead for the US cycle. 
Graph 13: GDP cycle(1), euro area and USA
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(1) The cycle is measured in deviation from a trend calculated with a B-K filter. 
Source: Commission services, ECB and BEA.
 
On average, the US cycle led the euro-area cycle 
by 4 quarters for an overall correlation of about 
65% over the past three decades. However, the 
average picture conceals large differences 
depending on the sub-periods considered. 
Graph 14 displays the correlation between de-
trended GDP in the euro area and the US for 
three periods corresponding broadly to the last 
three euro-area cycles (1975-85, 1986-96 and 
1997-036). In addition, it also shows the 
correlation for the period since the last cyclical 
peak (2000-03). For all periods, the correlation is 
calculated for various lags of the euro-area 
economy.  
In the current cycle (1997-03) the highest 
correlation of output gaps is reached when the 
euro area is lagged by 4-5 quarters. This is quite 
short compared with the 1986-96 period during 
which the euro-area cycle was lagging the US 
cycle by more than two years. Shorter lags (2-3 
quarters) were registered during the 1975-85 
period but the current cycle is characterised by a 
combination of short lags and high correlation, 
which has not been matched in the past three 
decades.  
                                                      
5  An advantage of the BK filter is that it filters both the 
trend and the fluctuations at high frequencies (1 to 6 
quarters) which are unrelated to the cycle, thereby 
resulting in a smooth measure of the cycle. 
6  There is an inevitable degree of arbitrariness in the choice 
of the periods corresponding to the three cycles. The rule 
adopted here was to choose the beginning of a clear 
phase of recovery as the starting point of a cycle. 
Graph 14: Correlation between the 
euro-area and the US cycles (1)
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(1) Correlation of detrended GDP. B-K filter.
Source: Commission services, ECB and BCA  
Two explanations may be ventured for the high 
degree of synchronisation between the USA and 
the euro area in recent years. On the one hand, 
synchronisation may be the consequence of 
increased trade and financial linkages between 
the two regions. Increased linkages facilitate the 
transmission of economic impulses across 
borders and the associated cyclical 
synchronisation should then be part of a lasting 
convergence pattern. On the other hand, recent 
cyclical synchronisation may reflect the fact that 
both regions have been hit by common shocks. 
In that case, cyclical convergence could be 
considered as somewhat “accidental”, leaving 
open the possibility of episodes of substantial 
cyclical disconnection between the two regions 
in the future. These two possible explanations, 
which are of course not mutually exclusive, are 
discussed in turn in the next two sub-sections.  
Transmission channels have become more 
potent in recent years 
Cyclical impulses may be transmitted from one 
country to another via three major and largely 
interrelated channels: trade linkages, financial 
(and corporate) linkages and confidence 
spillovers.7 
Trade linkages. The USA is one of the major 
trading partners of the euro area. It accounts for 
about 17% of extra-euro-area exports in the case 
of goods and above 25% in the case of services. 
However, with exports of goods and services to  
 
                                                      
7  For a comprehensive discussion of international linkages 
see European Commission (2001) “The EU Economy 
2001 Review”, European Economy No. 73, pp 30-42. 
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the USA representing about 4% of euro-area 
GDP, the direct impact of fluctuations of US 
demand on euro-area activity is relatively small.  
Direct trade linkages with the USA are, however, 
amplified by indirect linkages due to the fact that 
the US is an important destination for many 
trade partners of the euro area, most notably the 
UK but also Asia and Latin America. Indirect 
trade linkages are difficult to measure but, 
according to some estimates, they may add 
substantially to the effect of direct linkages. 
Hence, INSEE reckons that indirect trade 
effects may multiply the original impact of a 
change in US imports on euro-area exports by 
about 2 to 3. These effects would only come to 
be felt progressively and fully over a longer 
period of time than direct effects. 8  
In any event, trade integration between the USA 
and the euro area increased rapidly over the 
1990s suggesting that this transmission channel 
has gained in importance. Since the mid-1990s, 
euro-area exports of goods to the USA have 
increased by more than 80% in real terms and 
140% in nominal terms. Over the same period, 
real GDP has expanded by about 15%.  
Financial and corporate linkages. Financial 
integration is another important source of 
international transmission of economic shocks. 
To the extent that it encourages the cross-border 
diversification of portfolios and closer co-
movements of the prices of financial assets, 
                                                      
8  Institut national de la statistique et des études 
économiques (INSEE), Conjuncture in France, March 
2001 , p 7-8. 
financial integration facilitates the international 
synchronisation of wealth effects and private 
consumption. Closer co-movements of asset 
prices also lead to convergence in capital costs 
and investment. Finally, financial integration also 
facilitates cross-border merger and acquisition 
activity and thereby cross-border corporate 
linkages.  
In recent years, the rise in financial linkages 
between the USA and the euro area has been 
particularly clear when looking at foreign direct 
investment (Graph 15). FDI from and, above all, 
to the USA surged in the late 1990s, leading to a 
significant intensification of corporate linkages 
between the two regions.  
Graph 15: Euro-area foreign direct investment 
with the USA (as a share of GDP) (1)
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(1) Preliminary data for 2002.
Source: Commission services.  
There is also evidence of a rising correlation of 
returns on equity assets in the USA and other 
developed countries.9 Finally, there are signs that 
                                                      
9  See Brooks and Del Negro (2003), ‘Firm-level evidence 
on international stock market comovement’, IMF 
Working Paper WP/03/55. 
Table 3: Main trade partners of the euro area 
 Goods (2002) Services (2001) 
 Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Total extra-EU12 trade in bn euro 1080 983 316 314 
 Main partners (share in %) 
EU excluding euro area  24.7 21.1 31.0 26.1 
Other Europe 25.4 26.3 19.0 20.0 
USA 16.9 12.8 25.8 28.9 
America excl. USA 6.1 5.5 5.5 5.6 
Japan 3.0 5.4 3.8 2.6 
Asia excl. Japan 15.8 20.8 7.7 9.5 
Africa 5.5 7.0 4.5 5.2 
 
Source: Commission services. 
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corporate bond markets have been a substantial 
vector of contagion in the corporate sector in 
the current downturn. Hence, the correlation of 
spreads on corporate bonds between the euro 
area and the USA has been very high in the 
downturn. Based on daily data it has exceeded 
96% since summer 2001 for BBB-rated bonds. 
The Enron and Worldcom scandals in the USA 
have led to sharp and simultaneous revisions of 
risk assessments and spreads on both sides of 
the Atlantic.  
Confidence spillovers. In practice, confidence 
contagion effects are difficult to disentangle 
from trade and financial linkages. In particular, 
increased cross-border linkages between 
companies are likely to be a major source of 
spillovers in business confidence. In fact, the 
analysis of confidence indicators points to 
possible strong confidence contagion effects in 
the corporate sector. In the current cycle, the 
USA has been leading the euro area in terms of 
consumer and business sentiment by 6 and 8 
months, respectively. However, correlations for 
the two types of confidence show very different 
patterns (Graph 16).  
Graph 16: Confidence correlation between the 
euro area and the US (1998-03) (1)
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Source: Commission services, ISM, Michigan University
 
In the case of consumer sentiment, 
contemporaneous correlation is very high and 
correlation increases only moderately for lagged 
values of the euro-area indicator. This points to 
common shocks as the most likely explanation 
of observed co-movements in consumer 
confidence. Confidence spillovers are indeed 
likely to be transmitted with some delays and are 
not, on the face of it, expected to be very strong 
for consumers.  
In the case of business confidence, 
contemporaneous correlation is close to zero but 
correlation increases rapidly when the euro area 
is lagged. Such a pattern is a-priori consistent 
with contagion effects. This interpretation is 
further supported by the observation that the 
correlation of business confidence between the 
euro area and the USA has been quite stable 
since the mid-1990s. In contrast, the correlation 
of consumer confidence has been more volatile, 
suggesting that several common shocks have 
temporarily forced a higher degree of 
synchronisation between the euro area and the 
USA. 
Common shocks have also bolstered cyclical 
convergence since the late 1990s 
Since the late 1990s, the euro area and the USA 
have been hit simultaneously by large 
fluctuations in oil prices, the forming and the 
bursting of an equity bubble, sharp changes in 
risk premiums on lending to the corporate 
sector, several confidence shocks – September 
11, the Iraq war – and a severe slump in world 
trade. These common shocks have increased the 
synchronisation of the business cycles of the two 
regions.10  
The high degree of synchronisation of consumption cycles 
reflects the importance of common shocks. A striking 
feature of the recent cyclical convergence 
between the euro area and the USA is that it has 
come with a high degree of synchronisation of 
consumption in the two regions (Graph 17 on 
next page). Since the late 1990s, the correlation 
of the consumption cycles has been about 98% 
for a lag of the euro area relative to the USA not 
exceeding 1 quarter. Hence, the correlation has 
been significantly higher and the lag considerably 
smaller than in the case of GDP. Such a degree 
of synchronisation of consumption is very high 
by historical standards and even significantly 
higher than what was registered in the late 1970s 
                                                      
10  In some cases, it is difficult to make a clear distinction 
between a common shock and a shock hitting one 
country and then transmitted rapidly to another via 
contagion effects. Hence, September 11 is considered 
here as a common shock but might also be interpreted as 
an example of confidence contagion.  
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when cyclical fluctuations in the two regions 
were dominated by common oil shocks.  
Graph 17: Consumption cycles,(1) euro area and USA
 (1975-03) 
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(1) The cycle is measured in deviation from a trend calculated with a B-K filter. 
Source: Commission services, ECB, BEA.
 
In theory, the synchronisation of consumption 
cycles could result from the integration of 
financial markets, via the international 
diversification of portfolios and increasing co-
movements in asset prices. In practice, this is 
rather unlikely insofar as empirical studies 
continue to point to large differences in the 
impact of asset prices on private spending in the 
USA and in Europe. The observed 
synchronisation of consumption cycles is likely 
to be primarily a consequence of the succession 
of common shocks that have hit household 
spending in the euro area as well as in the USA 
since the late 1990s. This conclusion is 
substantiated by the relative instability of the 
correlation of consumer confidence between the 
two regions.  
Co-movements in investment reflect both common shocks 
and contagion effects. The picture is somewhat 
different when looking at the investment cycle. 
Table 4 displays the maximum cyclical 
correlation between the euro area and the USA 
for various GDP components in the present 
cycle and its 1987-96 predecessor.11 As shown in 
the table, the synchronisation of the investment 
cycles has increased substantially in the current 
cycle relative to its 1987-96 predecessor. In 
recent years, the correlation of the investment 
cycles has been very high and only slightly lower 
than for consumption. However, the average lag 
                                                      
11  US data for investment and inventories are not available 
separately prior to 1987 so that comparisons with earlier 
cycles are unfortunately impossible.  
of 4 quarters of the euro area relative to the USA 
has been significantly larger than in the case of 
household spending. 
Table 4: Cyclical correlation (1) between the euro 
area and the USA (in %) 
1987-96 1997-03 
Main GDP components 
(relative to same US GDP component) 
GDP 85 (8) 92 (5) 
Consumption 91 (11) 98 (1) 
Investment 53 (8) 96 (4) 
Inventories 50 (4) 87 (1) 
Extra euro-area trade (relative to US imports) 
Extra-EU 12 exports 71 (1) 47 (2) 
Exports to the US 84 (0) 86 (2) 
(1) Highest correlation based on a B-K filter. Numbers 
within brackets are the lead of the USA in quarters for 
which this maximum correlation is reached.  
Source: Commission services. 
 
 
Although common shocks, such as sharp 
fluctuations in equity prices and risk premiums 
or confidence shocks, are likely to have played 
an important role in the synchronisation of 
investment cycles, observed lags are also 
consistent with spillover effects linked to 
corporate linkages from the USA to the euro 
area. For instance, profit losses incurred on the 
US market may have induced international 
companies to curtail investment in the euro area 
as well as in the USA. This effect must have 
gained in importance in the past years due to the 
surge in FDI between the euro area and the USA 
(see Graph 15). Strong spillover effects in the 
investment cycle would also be in line with the 
contagion effect for business confidence 
mentioned before. 
Comovements in trade have been affected by exchange rate 
fluctuations. The correlation between extra euro-
area exports and US imports has decreased 
significantly in the current cycle relative to 1987-
96 and has been far lower than in the case of 
private consumption and investment. This 
essentially reflects the impact of the Asian crisis 
on euro-area exports and large fluctuations in 
exchange rates. Whereas the initial weakening of 
the euro has accentuated trade spillovers from 
the US at the peak of the cycle and in the early 
stages of the downturn, its appreciation last year 
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has probably dampened the trade transmission 
channel in the past quarters.  
Graph 18: Detrended exports , euro area and USA 
(1987-03) 
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Source: Commission services, ECB, BEA.
 
Reverse linkages are still limited 
Finally, a word should be said about reverse 
trade linkages, namely the impact of activity in 
the euro area on activity in the USA. It should be 
noted that the contemporaneous correlation 
between de-trended US exports and euro-area 
imports has been rather stable at about 60-70% 
over the past two cycles. This is consistent with a 
non-negligible impact of activity in the euro area 
on US exports. However, the correlation with 
US exports drops rapidly for lagged values of 
euro-area imports. This suggests that, contrary to 
the trade transmission from the USA to the euro 
area, indirect trade linkages from the euro area to 
the US may be limited.  
Overall, co-movements between US GDP and 
lagged values of euro-area GDP are negligible, 
leaving little room for significant spillover effects 
from the euro area to the USA apart from the 
relatively small direct trade effect. US exports to 
the euro area represent only about 2% of US 
GDP (compared with 4% of euro-area GDP in 
the case of euro-area exports to the USA). This 
reflects the fact that the USA is a more closed 
economy than the euro area and that the euro 
area is a relatively small export market for the 
USA, specifically when compared to Asia and 
NAFTA.  
Implications for the ongoing euro-area 
recovery  
The analysis presented here suggests that, 
although cyclical transmission channels between 
the euro area and the USA have become more 
potent in recent years, the very high degree of 
cyclical synchronisation reached in the current 
cycle also owes much to the fact that the two 
regions have been hit by a succession of 
common shocks. In this regard, the ongoing US 
recovery is a positive signal for the euro area 
both because it heralds increased activity via 
trade and corporate linkages and because it 
marks the progressive unwinding of forceful 
negative shocks.  
However, common shocks may have asymmetric 
effects and the strength of the nascent euro-area 
recovery will also depend on the speed with 
which the economy absorbs past disturbances. 
In this respect, a striking feature of the current 
cycle is that, although activity in the euro area 
and the USA was highly synchronised at the 
peak of the cycle for most GDP components 
(investment, which peaked two quarters earlier in 
the USA, is the only exception), the US economy 
has emerged from the downturn clearly more 
rapidly than the euro area. In a context of 
common shocks, the cyclical lag of the euro area 
around the upturn could be explained by lower 
resilience to shocks. The US economy being 
more flexible than its euro-area counterpart, its 
response to shocks is notably faster. This means 
a sharper and more rapid downturn and also an 
earlier and faster recovery. In the current 
downturn, annual per capita GDP growth in the 
USA turned negative in 2001 before picking-up 
again already in 2002-03. In the euro area, per 
capita GDP growth has decelerated much more 
progressively since 2000, reaching near 
stagnation only in 2003.  Differences between 
the USA and the euro area in terms of response 
to the latest downturn are particularly striking in 
the corporate sector. As illustrated in the next 
two graphs, de-leveraging and improvements in 
profitability have both been more pronounced in 
the USA than in the euro area in the past two 
years. The flip-side of the stronger corporate 
adjustment in the USA has been sharper cuts in 
investment and employment during the 
downturn. However, there has been a clear 
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recovery of corporate investment in the USA 
since the second quarter of 2003. In contrast, 
signs on an upturn in investment remain limited 
in the euro area.  
Graph 19 : Profit margins,(1) euro area and USA 
1995-03 (index 2000=100)
96
98
100
102
104
106
Jan-95 Jan-96 Jan-97 Jan-98 Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03
USA Euro area
(1) Inverted real unit labour costs. 
Source: Commission services, BEA.
  
Graph 20 : Corporate debt as a share of GDP,(1) 
euro area and USA 1998-03 
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(1) Non-financial corporations. Data for the euro area and the USA come from different 
sources and are not fully harmonised.
Source: Commission services, BEA, Federal Reserve Board.
 
Overall, although the sharp pick-up of growth in 
the USA in the past two quarters is a positive 
signal for the euro area, its impact on the euro-
area recovery should not be overestimated as the 
strength and the timing of the euro-area recovery 
will also depend on the speed with which the 
economy absorbs past shocks. In addition, trade 
spillover effects from the USA to the euro area 
are likely to be somewhat dampened by the 
euro’s appreciation. Finally, it is important to 
stress that, if the high level of cyclical 
synchronisation between the euro area and the 
USA in the current cycle partly reflects common 
shocks, episodes of significant cyclical 
disconnection between the two regions remain a 
possibility in the future. 
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Focus 
II. Slow productivity growth in the euro area: 
causes and possible remedies
This focus section analyses the causes of the productivity slowdown in the euro area and identifies areas for policy action. Its 
main conclusion is that several factors have to be taken into account to understand the disappointing productivity 
performance registered in recent years. ICT has contributed positively to productivity in the euro area since the mid-1990s 
but this contribution has been much lower than in the USA, mainly due to a slower diffusion of ICT and difficulties in 
exploiting its full benefits. However, if ICT can partly explain diverging trends in the euro area and the USA in recent 
years, it cannot account for the observed deceleration of productivity growth in the euro area. This deceleration reflects the 
combination of a downward trend in non-ICT investment rates and a worrying slowdown of technical progress. It can partly 
be attributed to the upward shift in the employment content of growth observed in recent years but this effect only accounts for 
a quarter of the overall productivity slowdown and will be transitory. Research suggests that five other areas are at the heart 
of the sluggish performance in the euro area, namely the level of regulation, the structure of financial markets, the degree of 
product market integration, the size of knowledge investment and the ageing of the labour force. Further and rapid progress 
is needed in the first four of them in the context of the Lisbon reform agenda.  
1. Recent developments in growth and 
labour productivity12  
Over the past two decades, trend GDP growth13 
in the euro area has fluctuated within a band of 
about 2-2.5%, climbing from 2.2% to 2.5% in the 
1980s before falling progressively from the early 
1990s onwards to reach 1.9% in 2003. These 
overall fluctuations conceal quite substantial 
changes when disentangling the respective 
contributions to growth of labour utilisation and 
labour productivity. In particular, trends for 
labour utilisation and productivity have both been 
altered dramatically over the second half of the 
1990s.  
• After several decades of negative or zero 
contribution of labour to growth, the 1990s 
saw a progressive increase in labour input in 
the euro area. The pick-up was particularly 
important during the second half of the 1990s 
and employment has proved quite resilient in 
the current downturn.  
• Unfortunately, the strong recovery which took 
place in terms of the utilisation of labour was 
                                                      
12 This focus is based on an analysis carried out in DG 
ECFIN and first presented in the chapter ‘Drivers of 
productivity growth’ of the ‘The EU Economy: 2003 
Review’. 
13 All trends presented in this section are calculated with a 
Hodrick-Prescott filter.  
accompanied by negative developments in 
terms of labour productivity.14 After more than 
a decade of relative stability, trend labour 
productivity growth began to decelerate during 
the first half of the 1990s. In 2002, it was about 
1 percentage point lower than a decade earlier.  
Graph 21: Trend growth and its components, 
euro area (annual growth in %)
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Source: Commission services, GGDC.  
The recent productivity performance in the euro 
area stands in sharp contrast with developments 
in the USA where growth in labour productivity 
accelerated during the course of the 1990s. For 
the first time in decades, productivity growth in 
the euro area is now lower than in the USA.  
                                                      
14  Productivity estimates in this section are based on hours 
worked rather than the total number of jobs. For data 
availability reasons, annual hours worked were taken from 
the ‘Groningen Growth and Development Centre and 
Conference Board Database’ rather than Eurostat. 
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Graph 22: Trend growth and its components, 
USA (annual growth in %)
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Source: Commission services, GGDC.
The slowdown in productivity in the euro area is 
worrying on several accounts. First, it marks a 
reversal of the convergence process towards US 
standards of living observed during most of the 
post World War II period. Second, the euro area 
was, until recently, able to maintain relatively high 
income growth due to its superior productivity 
performance. The strong employment growth 
registered since the mid-1990s is a consequence 
of the return to a healthier rate of utilisation of 
the labour force and is therefore bound to boost 
growth only temporarily. Finally, looking towards 
the medium term, it is only a matter of a few years 
before the negative effects of ageing populations 
really start to impact on the potential growth rates 
of a large number of euro-area Member States. 
Turning to the broad picture at the Member 
States’ level, 3 groups of countries can be 
distinguished in terms of their overall growth 
performance since the early 1990s. The first 
group, comprising two of the largest Member 
States, namely Germany and Italy, stands out for 
a persistently poor performance relative to the 
euro-area average throughout the 1990s. These 
two countries represent almost 50 per cent of 
total euro-area output, thus their performance 
constituted a significant drag on the aggregate 
euro-area position. A second group, made up of 
Belgium, France and Austria grew close to the 
euro-area average. The final group of mainly small 
countries (Greece, Spain, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Finland) managed to 
grow at a significantly faster pace than the euro 
area as a whole, especially over the second half of 
the 1990s. For example, for the period 1996-2002, 
this latter group of euro-area countries grew on 
average by 3.6 per cent, compared with 3.3 for the 
USA and 2.2 for the euro area as a whole. 
In terms of labour productivity growth, 5 of the 
euro-area Member States had performances 
which were not only well above the euro-area 
average but were also higher than that of the USA 
(Table 5). However, only 2 of the 5, namely 
Ireland and Finland were capable of combining 
both strong productivity growth and high labour 
utilisation rates. 
Table 5: Hourly labour productivity,  
euro-area Member States 
 1991-95 1996-2000 1996-2002 
BE 1.7 2.6 1.6 
DE 0.7 1.8 1.6 
EL 0.6 2.8 3.1 
ES 1.9 0.8 0.8 
FR 1.5 1.4 1.5 
IE 3.6 5.4 5.1 
IT 2.3 1.0 0.7 
NL 1.5 1.2 1.0 
AT 3.4 2.7 2.1 
PT 2.9 3.1 2.3 
FI 3.0 3.1 2.6 
Euro 
area  2.4 1.5 1.3 
USA 1.1 1.6 1.7 
Source : Commission services and Groningen Growth & 
Development Centre. 
  
2. Some insights from growth 
accounting 
Theories on the sources of economic growth have 
been discussed at length since the 1950s and are 
not without controversy. However, in recent 
years, the neo-classical growth model, initially 
proposed by R. Solow (1956) has been 
increasingly used in so-called growth accounting 
exercises which decompose real GDP growth into 
its main determinants. The objective is to try to 
measure the proportion of the overall growth rate 
of GDP which can be attributed to the 
accumulation of factors of production (i.e. to the 
growth of employment and fixed capital) and the 
part which can be attributed to independent 
technical progress or total factor productivity.  
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Table 6 presents the results of such a growth 
accounting analysis for the euro area and for the 
USA. Looking into the components of labour 
productivity, significant changes took place in the 
1990s in terms of both capital deepening and total 
factor productivity.  
Capital deepening: Growth in industrialised 
countries is characterised by a process of 
continuous capital-labour substitution, which is 
crucial for productivity and, consequently, income 
growth. The rate of capital deepening has 
decelerated sharply since the mid-1990s in the 
euro area but has increased in the USA. As a 
result, whereas the growth rate of the 
capital/labour ratio had traditionally been 
significantly faster in the euro area than in the 
USA, a growing gap has emerged over the second 
half of the 1990s in favour of the USA. 
This gap mirrors developments in investment in 
the two regions. While the investment 
performance in the USA in the late 1990s had 
some bubble features and has not proven to be 
sustainable, the comparatively lacklustre euro-area 
performance over that period is puzzling in the 
light of rising profitability and declining costs of 
capital. The significant fall in capital deepening in 
the euro area since the mid-1990s marks a halt to 
unfavourable capital-for-labour substitution and 
may partly be interpreted as a consequence of 
better functioning labour markets. However, 
other factors have also been at play. Some of 
them, such as deteriorated corporate balance 
sheets and excessive debt, are temporary and have 
shown signs of improvement in recent months. 
However, there is some evidence that structural 
factors have also contributed to dampening 
investment spending in the euro area and have 
weighed on the attractiveness of the euro area 
relative to other investment locations. These 
factors include adverse demographic trends, 
insufficient flexibility in product and labour 
markets as well as insufficient development of 
financial markets. 15 
Total factor productivity: Potentially the most 
worrying aspect of the analysis presented in 
Table 6 is the evolution of TFP. For the first time 
in a generation, the USA has a trend rate of TFP 
growth which is now higher than the euro area’s. 
This significant turning point results from a 
combination of a sharp downturn in the euro-area 
trend and a pick-up in the USA.  
                                                      
15 For a discussion of the determinants of investment see 
European Commission (2001), ‘The EU Economy: 2001 
Review’, European Economy No. 73, pp 87-121. 
Table 6: Decomposition of GDP growth rates, euro area and USA 
(1980-02) 
        1981-90 1991-95 1996-00 1996-02
 Euro area 
GDP 2.4 1.6 2.6 2.2
  Labour in hours worked 0.1 -0.8 1.0 0.9
      Employment  0.7 -0.2 1.4 1.3
      Hours worked -0.6 -0.6 -0.4 -0.4
  Hourly productivity 2.3 2.4 1.5 1.3
      Capital deepening 0.8 1.1 0.4 0.4
      Total factor productivity 1.5 1.3 1.1 0.9
 USA 
GDP 3.2 2.4 4.1 3.3
  Labour in hours worked 1.8 1.3 2.4 1.6
      Employment  1.8 1.1 2.0 1.3
      Hours worked -0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3
  Hourly productivity 1.4 1.1 1.6 1.7
      Capital deepening 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.6
      Total factor productivity 1.2 0.8 1.3 1.1
Source: Commission Services and Groningen Growth & Development Centre.  
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3. A first view of industrial sectors  
Aggregate productivity is calculated as a weighted 
average of underlying industry productivity, with 
the weights being determined by each industry’s 
share in overall employment. Consequently, the 
change in an economy’s productivity growth rate 
over a specific period of time is determined not 
only by the productivity growth rate of the 
individual industries but also by changes in the 
industry composition of employment. Aggregate 
changes in productivity can be due to the former, 
within industry, effect or they can reflect the latter 
phenomenon of structural shifts in resources 
between low productivity and high productivity 
industries.  
Shift-share analysis is the most commonly used 
algebraic method for calculating the industry 
effects embedded in total productivity data. It 
breaks down aggregate productivity growth into 3 
effects: an intra-industry, a structural shift and an 
interaction effect. The first one measures the 
productivity growth that would have prevailed in 
the absence of changes in the relative importance 
of individual industries. The second captures the 
contribution to overall productivity growth of a 
shift of employment resources from low to high 
productivity industries. The last effect is a residual 
and is generally comparatively small.  
Graph 23: Decomposition of annual hourly productivity 
growth, EU
(Shift share analysis (1))
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(1) Due to is very small size, the interaction effect is not shown.
Source: Commission services, GGDC.  
Graph 23 displays estimates of the two most 
important effects in the EU16 since 1980. The 
analysis shows that the intra-industry effect 
dominates. Depending on the periods considered, 
                                                      
16 The shift-share analysis has only been performed for the 
EU as a whole but the picture is likely to be the same for 
the euro area. 
it accounts for between 80 and 95% of total 
growth in productivity. In addition, European 
productivity has been, and still is, benefiting from 
a shift of employment from low to high 
productivity industries. However, the 
contribution from this mechanism to overall 
productivity growth has been declining over time, 
falling from ½ a percentage point in the 1980s to 
less than a ¼ of a percentage point in the 1990s.  
Graph 24: Decomposition of annual hourly productivity 
growth, USA
(Shift share analysis (1))
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(1) Due to is very small size, the interaction effect is not shown.
Source: Commission services, GGDC.  
In contrast, the structural shift effect has been 
clearly negative in the USA in the past two 
decades (Graph 24). In this country, overall 
productivity growth has been entirely explained 
by within industry productivity gains which have 
more than offset the depressing impact on 
productivity of a shift from the high productivity 
manufacturing sector to lower productivity 
service sectors. It is likely that the EU and the 
euro area are following a similar route, leaving 
intra-industry gains in productivity as the only 
solution to raising overall productivity growth.  
4. The specific role of ICT: the broad 
picture  
The rapid growth of production in the 
information and communication technology 
sector and the widespread adoption of new 
information and communication technologies by 
other sectors are likely to have been a major 
driving force of productivity developments since 
the late 1990s. ICT can contribute to overall 
growth via several channels: 1) Rapid technical 
progress in the ICT sector translates into faster 
growth in total factor productivity in that sector 
thereby lifting the growth rate of TFP in the 
economy. 2) Investment in ICT raises the capital 
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stock and therefore total potential output via a 
capital deepening effect. 3) Finally, the use of ICT 
investment may be associated with increased 
productive efficiency or externalities that may 
further boost TFP growth.  
Graphs 25 presents an assessment of the 
contribution of ICT to labour productivity in a 
growth accounting framework. Analysing the 
contribution of ICT to growth requires reliable 
and internationally comparable data on ICT 
capital and ICT production. The graph is based 
on data gathered by the Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre (GGDC). Three caveats are 
necessary. First, although these data allow a 
meaningful comparison between Europe and the 
USA, it is important to stress that they cover 4 
EU countries (Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands) and not the euro 
area per se. Second, the data set is based on 
industry data and is not fully comparable with the 
national account data provided in Table 6. Finally, 
the contribution of ICT includes the first two 
channels listed above, but no estimate is yet 
available on the size of ICT spillover effects (i.e. 
the third channel). Bearing this in mind, 4 
conclusions emerge from the data: 
• Whilst investment in ICT equipment 
contributed positively to labour productivity 
growth in the EU-4 in the 1990s, the 
contribution was substantially lower than that 
in the USA. 
• Non-ICT capital deepening fell significantly in 
the EU-4 over the 1996-2000 period, with only 
part of the relatively poor investment 
performance due to the higher labour content 
of growth. Over the same period the USA has 
experienced a small acceleration in its trend 
rate of non-ICT capital spending. 
• In terms of TFP, the contribution of technical 
progress in ICT-producing industries such as 
semiconductors and telecommunications 
equipment has been consistently higher in the 
USA since the early 1990s but, thanks to the 
good performance of the EU-4 in the 
telecommunications industry, the difference 
with the EU-4 is not as marked as in the case 
of ICT investment.   
Graph 25: Contributions of ICT to capital deepening and TFP, EU-4(1) and USA 
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(1) Germany, France, United Kingdom and Netherlands. 
Source: Commission services and Groningen Growth & Development Centre. 
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• Finally, the contribution to TFP from the non-
ICT-producing industries has shown a slight 
downward trend since the late 1980s in the 
EU-4. In the USA a deceleration of TFP after 
the mid-1980s was followed by a clear upturn 
during the second half of the 1990s. This 
upward pattern may be suggestive of some 
positive growth spillovers from ICT 
investment (third channel).  
Summing up the contributions of ICT capital and 
TFP in ICT-producing sectors, ICT was 
accounting for roughly 60 per cent of US labour 
productivity growth at the end of the 1990s 
compared with around 40 per cent in the case of 
the EU-4. These calculations exclude spillover 
effects for which no estimates are available.  
5. The specific role of ICT: the industry 
picture  
The general picture for ICT can be further refined 
by looking again at individual industrial sectors. 
Table 7 displays the contribution to the total 
change in labour productivity of individual 
industries, breaking down the manufacturing and 
the service sectors into 3 ICT-related sub- sectors 
(sectors producing ICT, sectors using ICT 
intensively and sectors using ICT less intensively) 
The table shows that the USA has pulled ahead of 
the euro area in recent years in terms of labour 
productivity growth due its superior performance 
in industries producing ICT and using ICT 
intensively.  
Manufacturing. In manufacturing, the differences in 
the contribution to productivity growth essentially 
stem from the ICT-producing sector and, to a 
lesser degree, from the sectors using ICT 
intensively. Euro-area productivity growth rates in 
ICT-producing industries are not dramatically 
different from those in the USA and picked up 
markedly in the second half of the 1990s as in the 
USA. However, the size of the euro-area ICT-
producing sector is much smaller than the 
equivalent sector in the USA, and the 
contribution to overall productivity growth is 
correspondingly smaller. In the manufacturing 
sectors using ICT intensively, where the euro area 
has traditionally posted faster productivity gains, 
the positive gap in favour of the euro area has 
narrowed during the second half of the 1990s.  
Services sectors. Services are the biggest contributors 
to overall productivity growth. They are also the 
main source of the US productivity advantage 
over the euro area. The US economy appears to 
have benefited enormously from substantial 
investments in the service industries using ICT 
intensively. Interestingly, the bulk of the 
contribution to productivity growth from ICT-
intensive services in the USA is concentrated in 
three sectors, wholesale trade, retail trade, and 
financial services. These three sectors account for 
about three quarters of the acceleration in 
Table 7: Productivity – a sectoral view, euro area and USA 
Contributions to average growth in labour productivity in the business sector (1991-00) 
 Euro area USA 
 1991-95 1996-00 1991-95 1996-00 
Total business sector (2) 2.2 1.7 1.7 3.1 
  Manufacturing  1.1 0.7 0.9 1.2 
    Sectors producing ICT 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.9 
    Sectors using ICT intensively 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 
    Sectors using ICT less intensively 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.1 
   Private services  1.1 0.9 0.8 2.0 
    Sectors producing ICT 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 
    Sectors using ICT intensively 0.4 0.5 0.5 1.8 
    Sectors using ICT less intensively 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Residual term (1) 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 
(1) Shift and interaction effects 
(2) Data on aggregate labour productivity differ from those presented in Table 6 because they are restricted to the business 
sector and because they come from an industry dataset rather than from national accounts.  
Source: Commission Services and Groningen Growth & Development Centre. 
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productivity observed in the USA during the 
second half of the 1990s. Except to some extent 
for financial services, the euro area has clearly 
failed to raise productivity growth in the sectors 
using ICT intensively. The picture is quite 
different for ICT-producing services (i.e. mainly 
telecommunications) where the euro area is 
largely outperforming the USA in terms of 
productivity gains and has even increased its 
advantage in recent years. However, due to their 
smaller weight in total employment, the 
contribution of these sectors to total productivity 
growth remains small relative to ICT-using 
services. 
Finally, regarding the non-ICT part of the 
economy, the slowdown of the euro-area’s 
productivity growth rate in the manufacturing and 
service sectors using ICT less intensively (for 
instance textiles, hotels and restaurants) has been 
quite pronounced in recent years. These industries 
collectively still represent about 40 per cent of 
euro-area GDP and account for most of the 
overall slowdown in productivity in the euro area 
in the second half of the 1990s. The USA has also 
experienced a slowdown in productivity growth in 
the less high-tech manufacturing industries, whilst 
showing marginal improvement in the less high-
tech service sectors.  
Overall, an important conclusion emerges from 
the industry data: if ICT can largely explain the 
pick-up in productivity in the USA and can partly 
explain recent divergences in productivity 
performance between the euro area and the USA, 
it cannot account for the slowdown in 
productivity growth in the euro area as the latter 
essentially took place in non-ICT sectors.  
6. Structural drivers of productivity 
growth 
Whereas growth accounting exercises and the 
analysis of industry patterns has helped to identify 
the main features of the growth slowdown in the 
euro area, further work is needed to understand 
the fundamental determinants of growth and thus 
identify policy levers to improve standards of 
living.  
To shed further light on the fundamental 
determinants of productivity, a productivity 
model has been estimated. The model, which 
allows lessons to be drawn from the growth 
experiences of OECD member states over the 
last 2½ decades, attempts to integrate recent 
developments in endogenous growth theory into 
the neo-classical growth model. The standard 
neo-classical growth model treats technical 
progress (i.e. growth in total factor productivity) 
as exogenous. The endogenous growth literature 
endeavours to explain technical progress as the 
result of human capital formation both 
undertaken at the household and the firm level in 
the form of education, training and research and 
development spending. This literature regards the 
level of technology as being, at least partly, 
created by a knowledge production function. 
The estimated productivity model includes three 
stages.17 First, the relation between investment 
spending on physical capital and on R&D and a 
set of possible determinants was estimated. 
Determinants tested included the degree of 
deregulation, the characteristics of financial 
markets, market size and the education level. 
Second, a knowledge production function relating 
total factor productivity to measures of 
knowledge investment (R&D expenditure and 
education level) was estimated. The impact on the 
rate of technical progress of some institutional 
features, such as the degree of deregulation or the 
size of markets, was also tested. Finally, the 
results of the first two stages were used to 
estimate a productivity function, relating labour 
productivity to physical capital and the creation of 
knowledge. The contribution to overall labour 
productivity of two other important determinants, 
namely the labour supply and the potential for 
catching up, was also estimated.  
These sets of regressions offer some interesting 
insights into the determinants of investment and 
technical progress.  
Physical investment Amongst all the various 
determinants tested, regulation appears to be the 
most important driver of investment rates. The 
degree of regulation plays an especially important 
role for foreign direct investment (FDI) but it is 
also a crucial determinant of ICT investment. 
                                                      
17 For a complete description of the model see the ‘The EU 
Economy: 2003 Review’, Chapter 3, “Drivers of 
productivity growth”, Annex 1. 
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There is also some evidence that equity-based 
financial systems are more favourable to physical 
investment. Finally, a high level of education 
appears to be an important factor for foreign 
direct investment.  
R&D investment. The determinants of knowledge 
investment are rather different from those of 
physical investment. R&D is less affected by the 
regulatory environment whereas market size as 
measured by openness and population size is an 
important determinant. These results suggest the 
existence of important sunk costs and scale 
economies in the R&D process. As in the case of 
physical investment, the importance of equity 
markets and education are positively correlated 
with R&D spending. 
Technical progress. Unsurprisingly, the estimates 
show that both R&D spending and education are 
significant drivers of total factor productivity. In 
contrast, deregulation seems to play only a limited 
role in boosting technical progress. As a similar 
result was obtained for R&D investment, this 
empirical research suggests that the level of 
regulation only seems to affect productivity by 
stimulating the accumulation of physical capital.18 
Finally, the age of the labour force turns out to be 
a key determinant of TFP.  
                                                      
18  The empirical literature has produced conflicting evidence 
on this issue. Some studies find a positive impact of 
deregulation on TFP and others a negative one.  
Another interesting conclusion is that, although 
trade openness/market size appears to be 
especially important for productivity, this 
particular determinant only affects TFP growth 
via its impact on the level of R&D investment. 
This suggests that country size/scale effects 
bestow no particular efficiency gains in terms of 
other aspects of productivity growth.   
To give an idea of the relative importance of the 
various drivers of productivity, Table 8 displays 
the long-run impact on the annual growth in 
labour productivity of changes in some key 
determinants. Several interesting features of these 
results must be underlined. 
• The results confirm the strongly positive 
effects of education on productivity growth. 
• R&D investment has a much bigger impact on 
productivity than physical investment. 
According to the estimates in the table, a 1 
percentage point increase in the ratio of 
physical investment to GDP lifts productivity 
growth by only 0.05 percentage points over a 
30-year period whereas a similar increase in the 
ratio of R&D investment to GDP raises 
productivity growth by 0.6 percentage points. 
• Regulation and openness to trade are also 
important determinants of productivity. In the 
latter case it is interesting to note that recent 
studies have identified a large impact of EMU 
on trade, with some estimates of the potential 
Table 8: Long run effects of the major determinants of labour productivity, 
OECD countries 
 Impact on annual growth in labour 
productivity in %  
Physical investment  
(permanent 1 pp rise in the share of investment in GDP)  
0.05 
R&D spending 
(permanent increase in the share of R&D in GDP of 1 pp) 
0.60 
Regulation 
(moving to US levels of regulation) 
0.15 
Education 
(permanent increase of 1 year in the average education level) 
0.45 
Ageing  
(permanent 10 pp decline in the youth dependency ratio) 
0.25 
Openness and market size 
(permanent 10% rise in intra-euro-area trade) 
0.10 
Hours worked 
(permanent 1 pp increase) 
-0.25 
Source: Commission Services. 
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increase of intra-euro-area trade as high as 
40%.19 Associated gains in productivity could 
be substantial in the long run. 
• In contrast, an increase in employment may 
bear non-negligible negative consequences in 
terms of productivity. 
• Finally, the estimations point to a significant 
negative effect of ageing on productivity, 
thereby confirming a widespread suspicion that 
an older labour force will be less adept in 
creating and adopting new technologies. The 
estimated impact would represent a decline in 
the growth rate of labour productivity of 0.3% 
per annum for the last 15 years. 
The model can also be used to explore further the 
relation between ICT and the euro-area’s 
productivity performance in recent years. The 
model actually fails to fully explain country 
differences in TFP growth since the mid-1990s, 
suggesting that recent years have been 
characterised by an atypical pattern of 
technological progress. In fact, industry 
specialisation in ICT production as well as the 
degree of regulation and the age of the labour 
force seem to have played a particularly important 
role in productivity gains in recent years. The last 
two factors suggest that favourable conditions in 
terms of technology adoption were especially 
prominent for TFP in the late 1990s. This is in 
line with the findings in terms of ICT-using 
sectors. Trade and financial services are two 
sectors where regulatory and institutional factors 
play an important role and they account for much 
of the overall increase in productivity in those 
countries where there has been successful 
diffusion of ICT.  
7. Policy implications  
Labour market reforms may have a temporary negative 
impact on productivity but this effect only represents a 
quarter of the overall deceleration in productivity. Since 
the mid-1990s the euro area has been 
experiencing a trend change in labour input. 
While in the 1980s and early 1990s the growth of 
labour input was at best flat, a positive labour 
input growth of 0.9 per cent per year was 
observed over 1996-2002. According to the 
                                                      
19 See Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, No. III 2003. 
estimates presented above, this increase in 
employment growth has slowed down euro-area 
labour productivity growth by about a ¼ of a 
percentage point per annum over the period in 
question. Hence, labour market reforms only 
account for a relatively small share of the 
deceleration of productivity in the euro area. 
Furthermore, it is important to stress that the 
increase in labour input observed in recent years 
marks a return of the economy to more healthy 
employment rates. It is therefore a once-off 
development that will bear only temporary 
consequences for productivity. Overall, there is 
no policy trade-off as labour market reforms 
boosting employment rates only lead to a 
temporary reduction in measured productivity 
growth, with no effect on the long-run 
productivity growth. 
While critical, deregulation is not enough to overcome the 
euro-area’s productivity gap. The level of regulation 
has been identified as a major driving force of 
efficiency gains and investment in several 
studies.20 This may be a particularly important 
issue for the euro area which tends to post a 
relatively weak performance on a range of 
different measures of regulation. However, 
simulations carried out with the productivity 
model described in the previous section show that 
deregulation, while crucial for investment, would 
be insufficient on its own to close the efficiency 
gap with the USA – presently of about 10% – 
within a relatively short time span and meet the 
ambitious objective set in Lisbon of making the 
EU the most competitive knowledge-based 
economy by 2010. A major reason for this stems 
from the limited dynamic efficiency gains of 
deregulation. Deregulation essentially affects 
physical investment and must be accompanied by 
measures which increase knowledge production. 
Action is needed to boost investment in the knowledge 
economy. This means essentially higher spending on 
third level education, on ICT and on R&D.  
Although ICT has played an important role in 
explaining productivity differences across 
countries in recent years, the comparatively low 
contribution of ICT in the euro area has more to 
do with a slower ICT diffusion and difficulties in 
                                                      
20 See for instance OECD (2003), ‘The sources of economic 
growth in OECD countries’.  
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exploiting the full benefits of ICT, than with the 
industrial specialisation and the comparatively 
small share of ICT-producing industries in the 
euro area. This means that efforts are needed to 
boost ICT investment and put in place the 
conditions that allow companies to reap the full 
benefits of ICT capital. Important areas for 
progress in this respect include financial market 
efficiency, education, labour market flexibility and 
deregulation.  
With respect to R&D, the focus should be on 
creating the conditions which will promote an 
endogenous increase in research spending. The 
empirical analysis has identified three main 
channels through which this could be achieved, 
namely higher product market integration, 
education and more efficient financial markets. 
Market size seems to be a crucial determinant for 
R&D, since the development of new products 
typically involves large sunk costs. Since research 
activities are human capital-intensive, education is 
an essential requirement for any R&D activity.  
More equity-based financial structures seem to 
have promoted the “riskier” forms of investment, 
such as R&D, more strongly than bank-based 
systems. 
Finally, ageing may be a serious source of concern for the 
long-term productivity performance of the euro area. In 
addition to the well-documented impact of ageing 
on labour supply and the rate of capital 
accumulation,21 the progressive ageing of the 
population may have a significant bearing on the 
rate of technical progress in the euro area.  
Overall the results presented here vindicate the 
policy framework established by the Lisbon 
strategy. However, adverse demographic 
developments and further increases in the 
employment rate will weigh on euro-area 
productivity performance in the coming years. To 
bear fruit, the Lisbon strategy will therefore need 
to be backed up by a commitment to, and the 
rapid and comprehensive implementation of, 
agreed reform measures. 
 
                                                      
21  The European Commission, EU Economy: 2002 Review’, 
Chapter 4, ‘Economic and financial market consequences 
of ageing populations’.  
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IV. Key indicators for the euro area 
1 Output 2001 2002 2003* Jan-03 Jul-03 Aug-03 Sep-03 Oct-03 Nov-03 
 Industrial confidence 1.1 Balance -9.8 -11.6   -12.0 -14.0 -11.0 -9.0 -8.0 -7.0
 Industrial production 1.2 mom % ch 0.2 -0.9   0.0 1.0 -0.7 -0.6     
  2001 2002 2003* 02Q3 02Q4 03Q1 03Q2 03Q3 03Q4 
 Gross domestic product 1.3 Ann. % ch 1.5 0.8 1.8 1.0 1.1 0.7 0.1 0.3   
 Gross domestic product 1.3 Qtr. % ch       0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.4   
2 Private consumption 2001 2002 2003* Jun-03 Jul-03 Aug-03 Sep-03 Oct-03 Nov-03 
 Consumer confidence 2.1 Balance -6.1 -10.6   -19.0 -18.0 -17.0 -17.0 -17.0 -16.0
 Retail sales 2.2  mom % ch 1.3 1.3   -0.2 0.3 -0.1 0.0     
  2001 2002 2003* 02Q3 02Q4 03Q1 03Q2 03Q3 03Q4 
 Private consumption 2.3 qoq %ch. 1.8 0.6 1.7 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.0   
3 Investment 2001 2002 2003* 02Q3 02Q4 03Q1 03Q2 03Q3 03Q4 
 Capacity utilization 3.1 % 83.5 81.2   81.0 81.5 81.1 80.8 80.7 81.2
 Gross fixed capital formation 3.2 Qtr. % ch -0.3 -1.9 2.0 0.0 0.3 -1.1 -0.5 -0.5   
 Change in stocks 3.3 % of GDP -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.4   
4 Labour market 2001 2002 2003* Jun-03 Jul-03 Aug-03 Sep-03 Oct-03 Nov-03 
 Unemployment 4.1 %  8.0 8.2 8.3 8.9 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8   
  2001 2002 2003* 02Q3 02Q4 03Q1 03Q2 03Q3 03Q4 
 Employment 4.2 Ann. % ch 1.4 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0     
 Shortage of labour 4.3 % 7.8 3.8   3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0   
 Wages 4.4 Ann. % ch 2.8 2.9 2.8 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.4     
5 International transactions  2001 2002 2003* Jun-03 Jul-03 Aug-03 Sep-03 Oct-03 Nov-03 
 Export order books 5.1 Balance -14.3 -22.0   -29.0 -28.0 -26.0 -25.0 -24.0 -19.0
 World trade 5.2 Bn. EUR 6454.1 6309.2   490.0 500.8 497.8 507.6     
 Exports of goods 5.3 Bn. EUR 767.4 776.9 823.4 85.9 92.7 76.5 90.1     
 Imports of goods 5.4 Bn. EUR 802.2 781.6 828.1 79.2 79.3 69.0 81.6     
 Trade balance 5.5 Bn. EUR -34.8 -4.7 -4.7 6.7 13.3 7.5 8.5     
  2001 2002 2003* 02Q3 02Q4 03Q1 03Q2 03Q3 03Q4 
 Exports of goods and services 5.6 Qtr. % ch 4.3 0.7 6.1 1.5 -0.2 -1.5 -0.6 2.2   
 Imports of goods and services 5.7 Qtr. % ch 2.1 -1.6 6.2 1.3 0.8 -0.6 -0.2 -0.4   
  2001 2002 2003* Jun-03 Jul-03 Aug-03 Sep-03 Oct-03 Nov-03 
 Current account balance 5.8 Bn. EUR -12.3 9.6 11.0 2.5 0.0 2.7 7.7     
 Direct investment (net) 5.9 Bn. EUR -104.6 -90.4   23.7 -3.2 -1.7 -9.6     
 Portfolio investment (net) 5.10 Bn. EUR 36.5 38.0   12.9 -35.6 -37.9 8.3     
6 Prices  2001 2002 2003* Jun-03 Jul-03 Aug-03 Sep-03 Oct-03 Nov-03 
 HICP 6.1 Ann. % ch 2.5 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.0 2.2
 Core HICP 6.2 Ann. % ch 2.0 2.0   2.0 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0   
 Producer prices 6.3 Ann. % ch 2.2 1.7   1.4 1.3 1.4 1.1 0.9   
 Import prices 6.4 Ann. % ch 0.4 -1.4 0.3             
7 Monetary and financial indicators  2001 2002 2003* Jun-03 Jul-03 Aug-03 Sep-03 Oct-03 Nov-03 
 Interest rate (3 months) 7.1 % p.a. 4.27 3.30   2.15 2.13 2.14 2.15 2.14 2.16
 Bond yield (10 years) 7.2 % p.a. 5.00 4.80   3.64 3.95 4.15 4.20 4.25 4.38
 ECB repo rate 7.3  % p.a. 3.25 2.75 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
 Stock markets 7.4  Index 4047 3053   2443 2460 2524 2553 2515 2618
 M3 7.5 Ann. % ch 5.3 5.6   8.5 8.4 8.1 7.9     
 Credit to private sector (loans) 7.6 Ann. % ch 7.9 7.7   4.5 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.1   
 Exchange rate USD/EUR 7.7 Value 0.90 0.94 0.98 1.17 1.14 1.11 1.12 1.17 1.17
 Nominal effective exchange rate 7.8 Index 80.1 82.2 83.7 108.7 107.3 106.2 105.8 107.6 107.4
*     ECFIN Autumn 2003 forecasts (European Economy, No 5/2003 -October 2003) 
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Number Indicator Note Source 
1 Output   
1.1 Industrial confidence 
indicator  
Industry survey, average of balances to replies on production expectations, 
order books, and stocks (the latter with inverted sign) 
ECFIN 
1.2 Industrial production  Volume, excluding construction, wda Eurostat 
1.3 Gross domestic product  Volume (1995), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
2 Private consumption   
2.1 Consumer confidence 
indicator  
Consumer survey, average of balances to replies on four questions (financial 
and economic situation, unemployment, savings over next 12 months) 
ECFIN 
2.2 Retail sales Volume, excluding motor vehicles, wda Eurostat 
2.3 Private consumption Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3 Investment   
3.1 Capacity utilisation  In percent of full capacity, manufacturing, seasonally adjusted, survey data 
(collected in each January, April, July and October). 
ECFIN 
3.2 Gross fixed capital 
formation  
Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3.3 Change in stocks In percent of GDP, volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4 Labour market   
4.1 Unemployment  In percent of total workforce, ILO definition, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4.2 Employment  Number of employees, partially estimated, seasonally adjusted ECB/ 
Eurostat 
4.3 Shortage of labour Percent of firms in the manufacturing sector reporting a shortage of labour 
(unfilled job openings) as a constraint to production, seasonally adjusted  
ECFIN 
4.4 Wages  Not fully harmonised concept, but representative for each Member State 
(mostly hourly earnings) 
ECFIN 
5 International 
transactions 
  
5.1 Export order books Industry survey; balance of positive and negative replies, seasonally adjusted ECFIN 
5.2 World trade Bn; EUR, current prices, seasonally adjusted ECFIN 
5.3 Exports of goods Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area trade, fob Eurostat 
5.4 Imports of goods  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area trade, cif Eurostat 
5.5 Trade balance Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area trade, fob-cif Eurostat 
5.6 Exports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.7 Imports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.8 Current account balance  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area transactions; before 1997 partly estimated ECB 
5.9 Direct investment   (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area transactions ECB 
5.10 Portfolio investment  (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area transactions ECB 
6 Prices   
6.1 HICP  Harmonised index of consumer prices Eurostat 
6.2 Core HICP Harmonised index of consumer prices, excluding energy and unprocessed 
food 
Eurostat 
6.3 Producer prices Without construction Eurostat 
6.4 Import prices Import unit values for goods Eurostat 
7 Monetary and financial indicators  
7.1 Interest rate  Percent p.a., 3-month interbank money market rate, period averages Datastream
7.2 ECB repo rate Percent p.a., minimum bid rate of the ECB, end of period Datastream
7.3 Bond yield Percent p.a., 10-year government bond yields, lowest level prevailing in the 
euro area, period averages 
Datastream
7.4 Stock markets  DJ Euro STOXX50 index, period averages Datastream
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7.5 M3  Annual percentage growth rate of seasonally adjusted flows, moving average 
(3 last months): from 1997 onwards corrected for holdings by non-residents  
ECB 
7.6 Credit to private sector 
(loans) 
Annual percentage change, MFI loans to euro area residents excluding MFIs 
and general government, monthly values: month end values, annual values: 
annual averages 
ECB 
7.7 Exchange rate USD/EUR  Period averages, until December 1998: USD/ECU rates ECB 
7.8 Nominal effective exchange 
rate 
Against 13 other industrialised countries, double export weighted, 1995 = 
100, increase (decrease): appreciation (depreciation) 
ECFIN 
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